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Abstract—Increasing electricity production from renewable
energy sources has, by its fluctuating nature, created the need for
more flexible demand side management. How to integrate flexible
demand in the electricity system is an open research question.
We consider the case of procuring the energy needs of a time-
shiftable load through a set of simultaneous second price auctions.
We derive a required condition for optimal bidding strategies.
We then show the following results and bidding strategies under
different market assumptions. For identical uniform auctions
and multiple units of demand, we show that the global optimal
strategy is to bid uniformly across all auctions. For non-identical
auctions and multiple units, we provide a way to find solutions
through a recursive approach and a non-linear solver. We show
that our approach outperforms the literature under higher
uncertainty conditions.
Index Terms—simultaneous auctions, demand side bidding,
time-shiftable loads
I. INTRODUCTION
Climate change is a defining challenge of the 21st century.
To reduce CO2 emissions, massive investments in renewable
energies have been made and will still be required. Since
renewable energy source are often not controlled generators,
electricity production as well as electricity prices are subject
to greater fluctuation than before.
Given the increased fluctuation on the production side, there
has been a greater interest in time shift-able loads on the
demand side [8, 14, 16, 19]. Time-shiftable and other flexible
loads can be found in various domains, such as: data centres
[7], heating systems [10], water distribution systems [15], and
household energy consumption [1]. Attention should be given
to industrial processes, which by their high energy intensity
can achieve a significant impact on the electricity system [3].
In order to take advantage of fluctuating prices on day-ahead
electricity markets, bidding strategies for time shift-able loads
have been investigated. The approach of Mohsenian-Rad [14]
suggests to bid only in a single time slot – the cheapest one
in expectation. We consider a slightly more abstract version
of the problem described in [14], to drive the point that under
the assumption of free disposal participation in all instead of
a single auction provides better results.
This work is part of the research programme Heat and Power Systems at
Industrial Sites and Harbours (HaPSISH) with project number OND1363719,
which is partly financed by the Dutch Research Council (NWO).
We extend the literature as follows. In the general case, we
extend the optimality requirement derived in Gerding et al.
[6] from single unit to multi-unit demand (see Lemma 1 in
Section IV). For the case of identical auctions, we show that
uniform bidding, i.e., not just bidding in a single auction but
participating in all auctions, is the optimal bidding strategy for
uniform distributions (see Theorem 2). For the non-identical
auction setting, in Section IV-C we: 1) provide a way to guide
a non-linear solver to converge more often to a non-trivial
solution; 2) provide a dynamic programming approach to make
the problem computationally feasible; and 3) show that our
approach outperforms solutions found in literature ([14]) under
higher uncertainty conditions.
II. RELATED WORK
Given our abstract procurement problem of a time shift-able
load, we will consider both literature particular to demand side
bidding and literature on bidding strategies more generally.
The problem of demand side bidding in electricity markets
with fixed demand in a single time slot is considered in Liu
and Guan [13], Philpott and Pettersen [17], while Herranz
et al. [11] considers multiple time slots and stochastic demand.
Neither, however, consider any control over the demand they
have to satisfy. In contrast, an electric vehicle aggregator,
as considered in Bessa et al. [4], Vagropoulos and Bakirtzis
[20], can control the charging rate of the electric vehicles
in its fleet. However, this flexibility is in magnitude only
and their bidding strategies, therefore, ignore the flexibility
to shift demand in time. Demand side bidding for time shift-
able loads is considered in Mohsenian-Rad [14]. However, we
will show that their assumption of no free disposal is causing
their solution to be sub-optimal.
The general problem of bidding in simultaneous auctions
is considered in the Trading Agent Competition [9, 21]. The
goal of their agent, however, was to construct bundles of non-
identical items, which were strong complements. Our agent on
the other hand values all electricity equally up to a particular
demand. Bidding in simultaneous auctions with identical items
has been considered in Rothkopf [18]. However, in their work
winning any auction yields some valuation independently of
the other auctions and what connects the auctions is a shared
budget that should not be exceeded. A shift-able load, as
considered by our work, on the other hand values electricity
only up to its demand and has zero valuation beyond that.
Closest to our work, Gerding et al. [6] develops optimal
bidding strategies for simultaneous auctions of identical items
with a unit demand agent. We extend their work from single
unit to multi unit demand.
III. MODEL
We consider the electricity acquisition problem of a de-
ferrable load, which within a bounded discretized time horizon
has to run for a total of s time units – possibly non-
consecutive. We assume that this deferrable load requires the
same amount of energy for every time step in which it is
switched on. Since, the energy part of the bid does not change,
we will, going forward, only focus on the price bid.
For the given time horizon, there exists a set of electricity
auctions T , which are held in parallel and ahead of time.
For readability reasons, we will use the terms unit(s) and
auction(s) interchangeably, where clear. To win the necessary s
units/auctions to run the load, the agent submits a bid vector
B = (b1, b2, ..., b|T |) over auctions T . ft(τ), supported on
the interval [0, λel], describes the clearing price distribution of
auction t ∈ T , while Ft(τ) is its corresponding cumulative
distribution, with Ft(0) = 0 and Ft(λel) = 1. The agent wins
auction t ∈ T if the submitted bid bt is at least the clearing
price of auction t.
The expected cost the agent incurs when submitting bid B
given a demand of s units and a set of auctions T is composed
of a market cost and a backup cost, see (1).
Cost(B|T, s) = CostM (B|T, s) + CostB(B|T, s) (1)
The expected market cost is the sum of payments to auctions
T . We assume that the agent is a price taker.
Assumption 1 (Price Taker): The agent has no effect on the
clearing price.
The payment per auction t ∈ T is the clearing price of that
auction, conditionalized on the agent winning auction t.






The expected backup cost is the payment made to a backup
generator in case of shortfall. If fewer than the desired s units
are acquired, the agent incurs the maximum price of λel. We
are making the assumption of free disposal.
Assumption 2 (Free Disposal): We assume free disposal:
any amount of electricity acquired beyond the agent’s need
can be disposed of at zero cost.
This assumption can be justified by assuming that there
exists an intra-day market at which excess electricity can be
sold at a non-negative price. Any excess energy that has been
obtained from the day-ahead market can be sold on the intra-
day market. We therefore only have to assume that prices on
the intra-day market are not negative. The backup cost is zero
if the agent wins more than s units. For any number of won
auctions j ∈ [0, s − 1] there is a set of subsets w ⊂ T such
that |w| = j. For every subset of auctions w, the probability






By summing over all possible sets w ⊂ T s.t. |w| = j, we
obtain the probability of the agent winning j out of auctions


















Here Prob(x = j|T,B) represents the probability of winning
j auctions out of the set of T when submitting bid B.
IV. OPTIMAL BIDDING STRATEGIES
We begin by introducing a requirement that any optimal bid
has to satisfy, see Lemma 1, and provide a strategy that always
meets this requirement, see Theorem 1.
Lemma 1 introduces the first optimality condition. We
define B−k as the bid vector B but with the bid for auction
k removed. x is the random variable indicating the number of
auctions the agent won. Intuitively speaking (4) states that the
bid submitted to any particular auction k ∈ T is proportional
to the probability of falling short in the remaining auctions.
Lemma 1: Any optimal bid for s out of T auctions has to
satisfy the requirement in (4).
bk = Prob(x < s|T \ {k}, B−k)λel ∀k ∈ T. (4)
Proofs for Lemmas and Theorems are given in Appendix A.
The most straight-forward bidding strategy is to bid λel
in s auctions and zero in all other auctions. We define this
as a special strategy (Definition 1). Among the Λs-bidding
strategies there exists one that submits λel to the auctions
with the lowest clearing price in expectation. Whenever we
compare any strategy to Λs-bidding strategies, we mean this
lowest price version of it.
Definition 1: Let Λs be the set of bid vectors which consist
of s bids of λel and (|T | − s) bids of zero value.
Next, we will show that any strategy that meets the require-
ment set out in Lemma 1 and wins or loses an auction with
certainty, i.e., Ft(bt) = 1 or Ft(bt) = 0, is a Λs-bidding
strategy (Theorem 1). This means that an optimal bidding
strategy is either a Λs-bidding strategy or participates in all
auctions with some non-zero bid.
Theorem 1: Any bid vector B that satisfies condition (4)
and contains a bid of value λel or 0 is an element of Λs.
A. Comparison to the Literature
Having established our model, condition for optimality and
first bidding strategy, we connect our work to that of [14].
Mohsenian-Rad addresses the energy acquisition problem of a
time-shiftable load that can be run within a single time step.
His approach considers submitting energy-price bid pairs to a
set of day ahead auctions with a secondary intra-day market
for recourse. Our bids on the other hand only consider the
price and we consider a backup generator instead of a second
stage intra-day market.
However, Theorem 3 in [14] states that the optimal bidding
strategy on the day ahead market is to acquire the entire
energy need from a single auction, i.e., submitting a single
non-zero bid for the entire energy need with a price equal
to the expected price on the intra-day market. In our setting
the intra-day market is replaced with a backup generator of
deterministic cost λel. The expected price on the intra-day
market in [14] can be viewed as our backup generator cost
λel. Translated to our setting, Mohsenian-Rad suggests bidding
λel in a single auction and 0 in all others. We will therefore
associate the strategy suggested by [14] with Λs-bidding as
defined in Definition 1.
B. Identical Auctions
We first consider an identical auctions setting. We will show
that uniform bidding satisfies (4) and provide an algorithm that
can quickly find the correct uniform bid value.
Assumption 3 (Identical Auctions): All auctions are identi-
cal: f(b) = ft(b) ∀t ∈ T.
We define the uniform bidding strategy as a bid B that
submits the same value to all auctions. For this setting, uniform
bidding satisfies (4).
Definition 2 (Uniform Bid): A uniform bid vector B is a
bid vector such that bk = bl ∀k, l ∈ T
Lemma 2: Under the assumption 3 , there exists a unique
uniform bid Bu = (bu, bu, ..., bu) s.t. condition (4) holds.
This uniform bid value, bu, can be found via interval
halving, as the right side of (4) strictly increases while the left
side decreases with increasing bu. bu can quickly be found by
interval halving.
1) Identical Uniform Auctions: Next, we consider the case
where every auction has an identical uniform price distribution.
Assumption 4 (Identical Uniform Auctions): The price of





We will establish uniform bidding as described in Lemma 2 as
the optimal bidding strategy for settings of identical uniform
distributions (Theorem 2). To do so, we first show that uniform
bidding is the only non-Λs bidding strategy that satisfies (4)
(Lemma 3) and that the uniform bid is a local minimum(
Lemma 4). Finally, we compare our results to a strategy
suggested by Mohsenian-Rad [14] and discuss the difference
in modelling assumptions we make.
Lemma 3: Under Assumption 4, any bid B that satisfies
condition (4) is either a uniform bid across all auctions or
B ∈ Λel
Lemma 4: Under Assumption 4, the uniform bid as defined
in Lemma 2 is a local minimum of the cost function.
Theorem 2: Under the assumption of identical uniform
distributions, uniform bidding is a global optimum, i.e., for
any n ≥ 2 and s ∈ [1, n− 1], the following holds
Costu(B
u
n,s|n, s) ≤ Costu(B|n, s) ∀B ∈ [0, λel]n,



















Fig. 1. Cost Difference to Λs-Bidding
where Bun,s is the optimal uniform Bid and Costu(B|n, s) is
the cost of submitting bid B in n auctions with uniform price
distributions when requiring s units.
In Theorem 2, we only establish optimality of uniform
bidding, but say nothing yet about the effect of the type of
load on performance.
Figure 1 shows numerical results of uniform bidding for
loads of different demand s. The graph displays the cost
difference between Λs-bidding and optimal uniform bidding.
For all numerical results we assume λel = 1. As was expected
uniform bidding outperforms Λs-bidding for all cases. As
the number of auctions increases uniform bidding further
improves. This positive effect of adding auctions appears to
be stronger for loads that have higher demand, as indicated by
the steeper slope for s = 5 compared to s = 1.
It is noteworthy here that Theorem 2 and Figure 1 seem
to directly contradict some of the results by Mohsenian-Rad
[14]. In particular Theorem 3 in [14] states that the optimal
bidding strategy is to acquire all energy from a single auction
with a bid equal the expected cost on the intra-day market.
In section IV-A we associated this bidding strategy with Λs-
bidding in our setting. To resolve this seeming contradiction,
we need to look towards the assumptions made by Mohsenian-
Rad. In particular the constraint of equation (6) in [14] restricts
the bidding strategy to those that never run the risk of obtaining
more energy than needed, while we assume free disposal of
additional energy, see Assumption 2. Our uniform bidding
strategy runs the risk of – in the worst case – winning all
auctions. Furthermore, Figure 2 shows the expected number
of units the uniform bidding strategy wins. Figure 2 indicates
that we not only run the risk of winning more units than
necessary but that for most cases we expect to obtain more
units than demanded. This over-consumption can be explained
by the backup cost being weakly larger than market clearing
prices. Therefore obtaining too few units causes a relatively
large penalty of λel, while an agent winning too many auctions
pays an often much lower market clearing price.






















Fig. 2. Expected # of units won
C. Non-Identical Auctions
We consider the problem of acquiring s units from a set
of non-identical auctions T , which follow truncated normal
distributions. We assume that the clearing prices for auctions
t ∈ T are distributed according to N0,λel(µt, σ2), i.e., the
un-truncated distributions differ in mean but not standard
deviation. Let the set of mean values be µ = {µt|t ∈ T}.
Without loss of generality, we assume that µi ≤ µj for i < j.
Given this setting we can rewrite the condition in (4) as a
root finding problem of a system of |T | non-linear equations:
bk − Prob(x < s|T \ {k}, B−k)λel = 0 k ∈ T
For finding a solution, we use the Minpack’s [5] ’hybrj’
method, which is an adaptation of Powell hybrid method.
This method requires us to provide a Jacobian. The diagonal
elements of the Jacobian are Jk,k = 1 and the off-diagonal
elements are Jk,j = fj(bj)Prob(x = s − 1|T \ {j, k})λel.
The entries for the Jacobian only differ by a factor of fk(bk)
from the second derivative and the reader is therefore referred
to Appendix C for a derivation.
This approach exhibits two challenges. First, evaluating
the function and Jacobian requires repeated calculation of a
term of the form Prob(x = i|T \ {k}, B−k), which if done




terms. This makes finding
a solution for larger systems computationally infeasible. The
second challenge is convergence to non-trivial solutions. Since
any bid Bs ∈ Λs, which can be constructed without the
need for any solver, satisfies the system of equations, a badly
initialized solver often converges to this solution.
The first challenge is solved by recursion. Let D be a set of
auctions and let BD be a corresponding bid vector. Let d =
|D| be the corresponding auction for bid b|D| – the last bid in
bid vector BD. We calculate Prob(x = i|D,BD) recursively
as follows
Prob(x = i|D,BD) = Fd(bd)Prob(x = i− 1|D\{d}, BD,−d)
+ [1− Fd(bd)]Prob(x = i|D\{d}, BD,−d),
where BD,−d is bid vector BD with the last entry removed.
Note that Fd and [1− Fd(bd)] are the probabilities of winning
and losing auction d, respectively. Going through the recur-
sion, we can calculate Prob(x = i|D,BD) by calculating the
entries in a table of size |D| × i.
The second problem, creating an appropriate initial guess, is
addressed by iteratively solving approximate versions of the
problem. To do so we partition T = ]G. For each group
g ∈ G, a group auction price distribution N (µ̄g, σ2), where
µ̄g is the average mean of the auctions in g, is defined.
To create the approximate problem, we replace the clearing
price distribution ft(τ) for each auction t ∈ T with the
corresponding group auction price distribution N (µ̄g, σ2). The
partitioning starts as a singleton G = {T}, i.e., all individual
price distributions are replaced with the same group price
distribution. Therefore, the first approximate problem is an
identical auction setting for which we find the uniform bid
as in Section IV-B by interval halving. The grouping is then
refined and a new approximate problem is constructed. The
solution to the prior solution is sorted (to ensure that higher
bids go to cheaper auctions) and used as the initial guess
for the new approximate problem. We refine the grouping of
auctions until every group consists of a single auction at which
point we reached the original problem.
The refinement of the partitioning can be done in one of two
ways. Either, we split every group in two approximately equal
sized subgroups. This means that we require log(|T |) iterations
of refinement to reach the original problem and therefore
add a factor of log(|T |) to the computational complexity.
Alternatively, we increase the number of groups by one every
time we refine the grouping, adding a factor of |T | to the
computational complexity. When increasing the number of
groups, we use k-means clustering on the set of mean values
µ to find the grouping.
1) Results and Discussion: We consider the problem of
acquiring a certain number of units from a set of non-identical
auctions, where the clearing prices for auctions t ∈ T are
distributed according to N0,λel(µt, σ2). Let µt be drawn from
a uniform distribution on the interval [0, λel].
We first look at the convergence rate. We consider the solver
to have successfully converged, when it finds a non-trivial
solution, i.e., a bid B /∈ Λs that satisfies (4). Figure 3 compares
the convergence success rate of different initializations. The
demand of the agent is set to s = 5. When initialized with a
uniform bid based on the identical auction approximation the
solver virtually never converges. Note that we do not mean that
the solver did not converge but rather that the solver converged
to a Λs-bidding strategy, which can be found easily without
the need of a solver. When increasing the number of groups
by one (k-means Grouping) the convergence rate is similar
to when groups are split in half at every iteration(Grouping).
This more refined increase of groups appears to add little
to the chance of converging to a non-trivial solution, while
adding a factor of |T | instead of log(|T |) to the computational
complexity. Increasing the standard deviation σ from 0.1 to 0.3
and 0.5 improve the chances of the solver converging to a non-
Fig. 3. Convergence-Rate

















Fig. 4. Cost Difference
trivial solution. Similarly, as the number of auctions increases
the success rate of the solver increases. For large number of
auctions and for high uncertainty settings, i.e., σ = 0.3 or
σ = 0.5, we reach a near 100% success rate.
Next, we compare the performance of our approach to the
Λs-bidding, which we associated in Section IV-A to the work
of Mohsenian-Rad. Figure 4 shows the cost difference between
Λs-bidding and the solution provided by our solver approach.
For visual clarity results where the solver did not converge to
B /∈ Λs were omitted. While, under low uncertainty, σ = 0.1,
ΛS is the better choice, as the uncertainty in the prices grows
(σ = 0.3, σ = 0.5) our approach appears to improve. The
solution provided by us further improves as the number of
auctions increases.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper considered the problem of an interruptible time-
shiftable electric load in acquiring multiple units of electricity
from a set of parallel auctions. We derived a condition for
optimality and established a direct comparison to Mohsenian-
Rad [14]. First, for the identical auction setting, we show
that uniform bidding is a solution that satisfies our optimality
condition. For identical uniform price distributions, we show
that uniform bidding, i.e., participating in all rather than
a single auction, is optimal. In comparing our results to
Mohsenian-Rad [14], we show that assuming free disposal
yields significantly reduced cost.
Second, for non-identical auctions, we use approximate
problem formulations to guide a non-linear-solver and provide
a dynamic programming approach to make solving the set
of non-linear equations computationally feasible. Numerical
results show that under high price uncertainty our approach
again outperforms the literature.
Regarding future work, we would like to extend this line
of research to include budget constraints of the agent. A
second line of extension can be to consider a wider range of
valuation functions that take into account potential secondary
uses of electricity as heat or temporal constraints of industrial
processes.
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APPENDIX
A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.
















For the backup cost, we have to consider the inner sum over
subsets w in (3). We split the sum into the terms for which
k ∈ w, see second line in (7) and into those for which k /∈ w,

































When k ∈ w, second line in (7), we know that |w| ≥ 1 and
therefore the outer sum is over j ∈ [1, s−1]. The derivative of
Fk(bk) is fk(bk). Since k ∈ w, the inner sum then sums over
the subsets of w of size (j−1). When k /∈ w, third line in (7),
we take the derivative of [1 − Fk(bk)] resulting in −fk(bk),
while the outer and inner sum stay unchanged.
Next we combine the terms of the second and third line in
(7) into one summation. To do so, we first extend and shift











We extended the summation to iterate over the range [1, s],
which can be done as (s− s)λel = 0. We then shift the index
j by one so that both sums iterate over j ∈ [0, s − 1]. This
only changes the tail of the second line from (s − j)λel to













(s− j − 1)λel
Next, we combine the two terms in (7) to obtain
∂CostB(B|T, s)
∂bk
= −fk(bk)Prob(x < s|T \ {k}, B−k)λel.
(8)
Given (6) and (8) we can rewrite (5) in the following way:
∂Cost(b)
∂bk
= fk(bk) [bk − Prob(x < s|T \ {k}, B−k)λel]
Proof of Theorem 1.
Proof: Let B = (b1, b2, ..., b|T |) be a bid vector which
satisfies condition (4). Let bi = 0 for some i ∈ T . Since B
satisfies (4), we know that Prob(x < s|T \ {i}, B−i) = 0.
This implies that it is certain that the agent wins s auctions
from T \ {i}, which can only be true if we submit λel to
at least s auctions. However, submitting λel in more than s
auctions cannot satisfy (4) as it would follow that for every
auction k ∈ T the agent wins s auctions from the remaining
T \ {k} auctions with certainty. Therefore Prob(x < s|T \
{k}, B−k) = 0 holds, causing a bid of 0, for every auction
k ∈ T contradicting the previous statement of bidding λel in
more than s auctions. Thus the agent bids λel in exactly s
auctions. By (4) the agent bids 0 in the remaining (|T | − s).
The proof works similarly for bi = λel.
Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof: Given a uniform bid Bu = (bu, bu, ..., bu), the
set of equations in (4) becomes a set of the same equation
and Prob(x < s|T \ {k}, B−k)λel becomes a function of bu.
Therefore, we only need to find the value of bu for which this
one equation holds:
bu = Prob(x < s|T \ {k}, B−k)λel.
As Prob(x < s|T \ {k}, B−k)λel is λel for bu = 0, 0 for
bu = λel and strictly decreasing and continuous in between,
there can only exist one crossover point where bu = Prob(x <
s|T \ {k}, B−k)λel.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof: Let B be a bid vector that satisfies (4) and let bl
and bm be the bids on auctions l and m, respectively. The
proof will show that either B ∈ Λs or bl = bm. Let B−l,m
be the bid vector B without the bids bl and bm. We assume
B−l,m to be fixed and solve (4)for bl and bm, respectively
(derivation can be found in Appendix B):
bl = Prob(x < s|T \ {l,m}, B−l,m)λel
− Prob(x = s− 1|T \ {l,m}, B−l,m)λelF (bm)
bm = Prob(x < s|T \ {l,m}, B−l,m)λel︸ ︷︷ ︸
a




Given the constants a and c and the fact that F (τ) = τλel , (9)
can be rewritten as follows:
bl = a− cbm
bm = a− cbl
Subtracting the second from the first equation leaves us with
bl−bm = c(bl−bm), which can only be true if bl = bm or c =
1. However, c = 1, i.e., Prob(x = s−1|T \{l,m}, B−l,m) =
1, means winning s − 1 units from auctions T \ {l,m} with
certainty. This can only be true when B ∈ Λs and (bl =
0, bm = λel) or (bl = λel, bm = 0). Therefore either B ∈ Λs
or B is a uniform bid over all auctions.
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof: The condition for a minimum is that the Hessian
matrix M is positive definite[12], i.e., xTMx > 0 ∀x ∈ R|T |.
Given are the uniform bid Bu and identical uniform price
distributions. The Diagonal elements of the Hessian M , are












= fk(bu)fl(bu)Prob(x = s−1|T\{k, l})λel.
A derivation for the second order derivative can be found
in Appendix C. Note that for uniform price distributions
fl(bu)λel = 1 and that for uniform bidding Prob(x =




















Matrix A is 1 at every entry, making all rows linearly de-
pendent and therefore A has rank 1 and only one non-zero
eigenvalue[2]. Any eigenvalue, eigenvector (λ, x) pair has to
satisfy Ax = λx, which holds for x = (x1, x1, ..., x1) and
λ = |T | > 0. Since all eigenvalues of A are non-negative, A
is positive semi-definite[2], i.e., xTAx ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ R|T |, and
therefore xTMx > 0 ∀x ∈ R|T |.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: Given Lemma 3 we know that uniform bidding and
Λs-bidding are the only two strategies satisfying (4). Given
these two options, we only need to show that uniform bidding
is always at least as good as Λs-bidding. We start by showing
that the theorem holds for a more restricted case of demanding
n− 1 units out of n auctions.
Base Case: For n = 2 and s = 1 the probability in (4) is
the probability of losing one of two auctions. The uniform bid









λel, which resolves to bu2,1 = 0.5λel. The ex-





is Costu(Bu2,1|2, 1) = 0.5λel. When bidding B ∈ Λs, the
expected cost per auction won is 0.5λel, while the expected
backup cost is zero, since winning s auctions is guaranteed.
Therefore, Costu(Bλn,n−1|n, n− 1) = 0.5(n− 1)λel. For the
case of n = 2 and s = 1, the cost associated with the Λel−Bid
Bλ2,1 is Costu(B
λ
2,1|2, 1) = 0.5λel – equivalent to the cost of
submitting Bu2,1.
Inductive Step: Assuming Costu(Bun,n−1|n, n − 1) ≤
Costu(B
λ
n,n−1|n, n − 1), we show that Costu(Bun+1,n|n +
1, n) ≤ Costu(Bλn+1,n|n + 1, n) by constructing B̃n+1,n =
(Bun,n−1, λel), i.e., bidding in n auctions according to the
uniform bid Bun,n−1 and submitting λel in the last auc-
tion. Since B̃n+1,n wins the last auction with certainty,




∣∣∣n+ 1, n) = Costu (Bun,n−1∣∣n, n− 1) +
0.5λel. For an equivalent reason, Costu
(
Bλn+1,n









∣∣∣n+ 1, n) ≤ Costu (Bλn+1,n∣∣n+ 1, n) .
(10)
Since by Lemma 3 B̃n+1,n is not a local minimum, its
associated cost has to be strictly larger than the cost of at least
one local minimum, which by (10) cannot be at bid Bλn+1,n.
The only alternative according to Lemma 3 is the uniform









∣∣n+ 1, n) .
Having shown that the theorem holds for n − 1 out of n
auctions, we next generalize this result to the setting of s units
out of n auctions. To do so, we introduce B̃n,s = (Bus+1,s, 0),
i.e., bidding uniformly as if there only existed s+ 1 auctions
and submitting 0 to all other auctions. Note that adding
auctions in which the agent bids zero has no effect on the
cost, because a bid of zero incurs no market cost and also




∣∣∣n, s) = Costu (Bus+1,s∣∣s+ 1, s)
as well as Costu
(
Bλn,s
∣∣n, s) = Costu (Bλs+1,s∣∣s+ 1, s) .
Since we already established the validity of the theorem for
n− 1 out of n auctions, we know Costu
(
Bus+1,s




∣∣s+ 1, s) and using this with the previous two
equalities we get Costu
(
B̃n,s
∣∣∣n, s) ≤ Costu (Bλn,s∣∣n, s) .
Since, B̃n,s is not a local minimum, its associated cost has to
be larger than at least one local minimum and therefore with




∣∣n, s) < Costu (B̃n,s∣∣∣n, s) ≤ Costu (Bλn,s∣∣n, s) .
B. Solving for a Pair of Bids
We assume a fixed bid vector B−l,m and try to find the bids
bl and bm such that (4) is satisfied. The procedure is the same
for bl and bm, we will therefore only do it for bl. Recall (4).
bl = Prob(x < s|T \ {l}, B−l)λel
. Winning fewer than s units from T \ {l} is the probability
of winning fewer than s units when losing auction m plus the
probability of winning fewer than s − 1 units when winning
auction m.
bl = F (bm)Prob(x < s|T \ {l,m}, B−l,m)λel
+ [1− F (bm)]Prob(x < s− 1|T \ {l,m}, B−l,m)λel
This can be rewritten as
bl = Prob(x < s|T \ {l,m}, B−l,m)λel
− Prob(x = s− 1|T \ {l,m}, B−l,m)λelF (bm)
C. Second Derivatives
We derive the second derivative for when submitting a
















[bk − Prob(x < s|T \ {k}, B−k)λel]
Note, that the first term in the above equation is zero because
Bu satisfies (4) and that Prob(x < s|T \ {k}, B−k) is not a











Prob(x < s|T \ {k}, B−k)λel (11)












The following derivation works similar to what has been done
in the proof for Lemma 1. For the derivative of the above
mentioned term we need to separately consider when l ∈ w
and when l /∈ w. When l ∈ w, we know that |w| > 1, causing
the outer sum to run over the interval [1, s − 1], take the






























When l /∈ w, the outer sum is not affected and we take the





















= fk(bk)fl(bl)Prob(x = s− 1|T \ {k, l}, B−k,l)λel.
